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ASSESSING CALIFORNIA‟S HYBRID DEMOCRACY 
 
THE COMING OF AGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY: CALIFORNIA‟S RECALL AND 
BEYOND 
By Mark Baldassare & Cheryl Katz 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007.  Pp. 247.  $72.00 cloth; $24.95 
paper. 
 
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA‟S FOURTH BRANCH OF 
GOVERNMENT 
By the Center for Governmental Studies, Second edition 2008.  Pp. 402. Available 
for download without charge online at 
http://cgs.org/images/publications/cgs_dbi_full_book_f.pdf, or hard copies 
through request to the Center for Governmental Studies. 
 
PARTY OF ONE: ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER AND THE RISE OF THE INDEPENDENT 
VOTER 
By Daniel Weintraub 








In the early part of this decade it appeared that California voters stood to 
use the devices of direct democracy—the initiative, referendum, and the recall—to  
take a more major role in crafting the state‟s public policy.   After all, in 2003 
California for the first time recalled a sitting governor, Gray Davis, and replaced 
him with actor-bodybuilder Arnold Schwarzenegger.
1
 Schwarzenegger, a 
moderate Republican in a Democratic state, was able to win a plurality of votes in 
a ridiculously-crowded field of 135 candidates by promising to be “postpartisan” 
                                                                                                    
*
 William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  As a 
matter of disclosure, the author has served as a legal consultant for the proponents of Proposition 
62 (open primary), Proposition 89 (campaign finance reform), and for proponents of an open 
primary measure similar to one that will appear on the June 2010 California ballot.  The author 
also served as pro bono amicus counsel for the Center for Governmental Studies in the United 
States Supreme Court case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
1
 For a detailed analysis of the 2003 recall, see CLICKER POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE CALIFORNIA 
RECALL (Shaun Bowler & Bruce Cain, eds. 2005). 
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and to “blow up the boxes” in Sacramento by going directly to the voters when 
necessary to make important public policy changes.
2
 
By the end of the decade, however, despite the promise of “hybrid 
democracy,”
3
 it appears that voters remain the junior partners in governance in the 
Golden State.  Schwarzenegger‟s boldest attempt to bypass the legislature and go 
directly to voters came in a special election he called in 2005.  Though 
Schwarzenegger raised and spent $56 million supporting his package of measures
4
 
(out of a total of an astounding $300 million spent on ballot measure activity in 
that election
5
), all of the measures that Schwarzenegger backed went down to 
defeat, some by large margins.
6
 
The 2005 experience was not isolated.  One lesson of this decade is that 
the devices of direct democracy remain too blunt and expensive as tools for 
anything but interstitial governance. While initiative supporters who have enough 
money can qualify just about anything for the ballot
7
 (and those without money 
                                                                                                    
2
 See DANIEL WEINTRAUB, PARTY OF ONE: ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER AND THE RISE OF THE 
INDEPENDENT VOTER 61 (2007). Schwarzenegger secured the vote of 48.6% of voters in the 2003 
recall election.  See http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2003_special/sum.pdf (last visited Feb. 
16, 2008). 
3
 Beth Garrett coined the term in Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.  
1096, 1097 n.7 (2005) (noting that Garrett‟s colleague Matt Spitzer had used the term “mixed 
democracy” but that Garrett chose the term “hybrid” “to capture both Spitzer‟s idea of a mixture 
and the notion of cross-fertilization”).  Garrett saw three dynamics to hybrid democracy: “First 
candidate elections can be influenced by the presence of initiatives on the ballot….Second, 
democratic structures and the laws regulating elections are likely to be different in a Hybrid 
Democracy than in a wholly representative democracy…Third, Hybrid Democracy affects the 
policies that lawmakers adopt because they are aware that the political game includes the 
possibility of initiative and referendum.  Strategic politicians, notably, Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
take advantage of Hybrid Democracy as they govern using the threat of initiatives as a bargaining 
tool.”  Id. at 1098. 
Though Baldassare and Katz repeatedly use the term “hybrid democracy” in their book, 
see e.g., MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING OF AGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY: 
CALIFORNIA‟S RECALL AND Beyond 1 (2008) (“California‟s experience serves as an example of 
„hybrid democracy‟ that could spread to other states”), they do not give credit for the term to 
Garrett. 
4
 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA‟S 
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 295 (2d ed. 2008). 
5
 Id. at 289. 
6
 WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, at 81. 
7
 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 4, at 284 (“Says Fred Kimball of the 
signature-gathering firm Kimball Petition Management, „If you want to have your kid‟s birthday as 
a holiday, give me a million and half dollars and I‟ll at least get it on the ballot for people to vote 
on.‟”). 
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), significant negative spending can derail many measures, 
even those that begin with popular support.
9
  Indeed, California voters went to the 
polls in statewide elections in this decade ten times, and by the time the decade 
ends in 2010 that number will reach thirteen.
10
  From 2002 through 2008 voters 
were asked to approve 63 ballot measures—43 voter initiatives
11
 and 20 ballot 
measures proposed by the legislature.
12
  California voters approved 18 of the 20 
legislative ballot measures (the large majority of them bond measures), a 90% 
approval rate.  But they approved only 14 of 43 initiatives, a rate of 32.5%.
13
  
Proponents and opponents spent over $1.3 billion on ballot measure-related 
activity in California in the 2000-2006 period.
14
 
Despite this flurry of activity, California‟s governance appeared in 
shambles for much of the decade, with the biggest problem being the inability of 
the California legislature to approve a state budget under the state constitution‟s 
tough rule requiring two-thirds approval of budgets,
15
 leading the state in 2008 to 
the verge of financial collapse.
16
  Moreover, the initiative process proved 
especially divisive in 2008 when California voters narrowly approved Proposition 
8, a measure amending the California Constitution to bar gay marriage.
17
  The 
                                                                                                    
8
 See id. at 169 (“The fact that no California initiative has relied exclusively on volunteers since 
1982, and that very few have used volunteers at all, indicates the difficulty in organizing and 
sustaining a grassroots movement capable of collecting several hundred thousand signatures.”). 
9
 Id. at 299-300 (summarizing studies). 
10
 California voters voted in March 2002 (state primary), November 2002 (general election), 
October 2003 (recall election), March 2004 (state primary), November 2004 (general election), 
November 2005 (statewide election), June 2006 (state primary), November 2006 (general 
election), February 2008 (state primary), and November 2008 (general election). See 2009 Ballot 
Measure Update, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_j.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).  A 
special election will be held in May 2009 to consider measures necessary to implement 
California‟s draconian budget cuts. Primary and general elections are scheduled in 2010.  These 
figures do not include additional local elections. 
11
 I include in this category four voter-initiated referendums considered at the February 2008 
election. See http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_primary/12_official_declaration.pdf. 
12
 The author complied these statistics by examining the record of the vote in the elections from 
2002 through 2008 posted at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2009). 
13
 Removing the four referenda from the totals, see supra note 11, the approval percentage falls to 
10 of 39 measures, or 25.6%. 
14
 Figures are not yet available for the three 2008 elections. 
15
 See CAL. CONST., ART. IV, § 12(4)(d). 
16
 See Jennifer Steinhauer, California, Almost Broke, Nears Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/us/18calif.html.  
17
 The text of the measure, the ballot arguments, and legislative analysis are at 
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/title-sum/prop8-title-sum.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).  
Proposition 8 passed with 52% of the vote.  
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 and there were reports of harassment of those who 
financially supported the measure.
20
  
 The one bright spot so far this decade is the 2008 passage of Proposition 
11, a measure that takes the job of redistricting out of the hands of legislators and 
gives the power to a group of citizens.
21
  Proposition 11 is far from perfect—its 
Rube Goldberg machinery for the appointment of citizen redistricters makes me 
very nervous
22
—but its passage shows a potential path for using direct democracy 
to cure some of the structural defects in California‟s system of governance.  As I 
discuss in Part IV below, governmental reform may be the greatest potential use 
of California‟s hybrid democracy, and the unheralded success of this decade. 
Before turning to the question of the future, it is worth looking back at the 
lessons from this decade.  The three very worthy books under review offer 
different angles on hybrid democracy in California at the beginning of the new 
century, and they each offer lessons on how direct democracy might be used in the 
future to improve California governance. Daniel Weintraub‟s portrait of Governor 
Schwarzenegger‟s term in office shows the limits of a “postpartisan” governor 
attempting to bypass the legislature through the initiative process.
23
  The Center 
for Governmental Studies (CGS) offers a comprehensive overview of the 
initiative process in California and a smorgasbord of reforms.
24
 Baldassare and 
Katz paint a portrait of California voters and their views about the initiative 
process.
25
  Together, these books show both the promise and limits of hybrid 
democracy in California. 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/7_votes_for_against.pdf (last visited Feb 20, 
2009). 
18
 Jesse McKinley, Top Lawyer Urges Voiding Proposition 8, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec. 19, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/us/politics/20marriage.html. 
19
 Jessica Garrison, Angrier Response to Prop. 8 Arises, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/13/local/me-prop813. 
20
 Brad Stone, Slipstream: Prop. 8 Donor Website Shows Disclosure is 2-Edged Sword, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/business/08stream.html.  
21
 The text of the measure itself, as well as the official summary and arguments in favor and against 
Proposition 11 appear at http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/title-sum/prop11-title-sum.htm.  
22
 Here‟s a simplified version of the procedure as contained in the measure‟s title and summary: 
“Requires government auditors to select 60 registered voters from applicant pool. Permits 
legislative leaders to reduce pool, then the auditors pick eight commission members by lottery, and 
those commissioners pick six additional members for 14 total.”  See id. 
23
 WEINTRAUB, supra note 2. 
24
 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 4. 
25
 BALDASSARE & KATZ, supra note 3. 
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I. THE SCHWARZENEGGER LESSON 
 
 Weintraub, a journalist and opinion columnist for the Sacramento Bee, 
offers a very readable and insightful portrait of Governor Schwarzenegger.  Like 
Schwarzenegger, Weintraub‟s politics are centrist and to some extent 
postpartisan,
26
 and his reading of Schwarzenegger‟s rise to the governorship is 
mostly sympathetic.  The portrait that emerges of Schwarzenegger is of an earnest 
individual, egotistical but without guile, who succeeded in attaining the American 
dream and who sought the governorship out of a Kennedyesque commitment to 
public service (Schwarzenegger is married to a Kennedy, journalist Maria 
Shriver).  Schwarzenegger began life by believing everyone should pull 
themselves up by his own boostraps, until he recognized that government help 




 Schwarzenegger comes across in Weintraub‟s book as a personification of 
the median California voter, liberal on social issues, conservative on fiscal issues, 
and ready to rail against the “special interests” with their hold on Sacramento 
politics.
28
  But more than anything, Schwarzenegger comes across as naïve about 
the ability of his “party of one” to get anything done in California.   
 The lesson that Schwarzenegger appeared to take away from the successful 
2003 recall was that of unlimited “people power.”  But the recall power is 
essentially a negative one that California voters have exercised only rarely
29
 to 
force some change to the system.  Getting positive change, especially given 
structural impediments to change in the California Constitution, is much harder. 
Even with Schwarzenegger‟s bully pulpit (and his continuing ability to use his 
movie-star aura to attract large crowds), he has been limited in his ability to 
harness people power either directly through the initiative process or indirectly 
through a threat to the legislature to go around them to the people to get what he 
wanted   
                                                                                                    
26
 See WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, at 2 (“Like Schwarzenegger, I am not wedded to the views of any 
one political party.  I have been a registered Republican and a registered Democrat, and am 
currently registered with no party at all.”). 
27
 Id. at 14. 
28
 Schwarzenegger‟s “entire campaign was built around the idea that „special interests‟ had taken 
control of the government.  „Money goes in,‟ he said, „favors go out and the people lose.‟ Carrying 
a broom to rallies around the state, he pledged to sweep the influence peddlers from the Capitol 
and restore the power to the people.”  Id. at 32. 
29
 There have been 118 attempts in California to recall elected officials.  Only five have been 
successful, the most recent being the recall of Governor Davis in 2003. 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2003_special/contests.pdf.  
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Schwarzenegger had an early success in 2004 getting workers 
compensation reform through the legislature under the threat of an initiative 
bypass.
30
  But his subsequent attempts at hybrid democracy have been much less 
successful.  He tried to run to the right of the California legislature by supporting 
a series of budget reform and other measures in a special election he called for 
2005.  Even the calling of the special election itself was controversial, given its 
cost and voter fatigue (with two elections in 2002, a recall in 2003, and two more 
in 2004). The measure drew heavy opposition from Democrats and unions, with 
the California Teachers Federation levying a surcharge on its members to raise 
over $50 million to be spent against the measures.
31
  Schwarzenegger‟s 
overheated rhetoric against his opponents (he referred to the Democratic 
legislative leaders as “girlie men”
32
) did him no good in burnishing his 
postpartisan credentials. 
 After that $300 million election, Schwarzenegger professed that he had 
learned his lesson.  “I have always relied on people and listened very carefully to 
the people….And that‟s something that you have to do when you‟re in the movie 
business…If one of the movies goes in the toilet, you know that was the wrong 
story, that‟s not the kind of movie you like to do….So I‟ve learned form that and 
the people sent a message to us that, „Don‟t come to us with all your stuff…Work 
it out at the Capitol.‟ And so that‟s exactly what we‟re going to do.”
33
 
 But “working it out in the Capitol” proved far more difficult than the 
statement suggested.  Schwarzenegger lurched somewhat to the left after the 2005 
election and before his reelection bid in a majority-Democratic state, choosing 
former Democratic Party activist Susan Kennedy as his new Chief of Staff.
34
  But 
if Schwarzenegger was trying to make peace on his left with Democrats he had 
new-found problems on his right with Republicans.  Though Schwarzenegger 
easily won reelection in 2006 as a Republican incumbent against a weak 
Democratic candidate, Phil Angelides,
35
 he had little luck getting Republicans in 
the state legislature to sign on to his programs.  
Nowhere were the problems greater than with the state budget. Each year‟s 
budget battle was worse than the last, with things coming to a head in 2008, when 
a $42 billion budget deficit lead to state worker furloughs, massive budget cuts, 
and the state forced to issuing “I.O.U.‟s” for income tax refunds.  Though under 
California‟s two-thirds budget requirement it took the votes of only three 
                                                                                                    
30
 Id. at 64-65. 
31
 WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, at 80, 106. 
32
 Id. at 74. 
33
 Id. at 85 (quoting Schwarzenegger). 
34
 Id. at 44. 
35
 Id. at 138. 
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Republican Senators and three Republican Assembly members along with all the 
Legislature‟s Democrats to pass a drastic budget cutting and temporary tax hike to 
close the budget cap, Schwarzenegger struggled to seal the deal with his fellow 
Republicans.  Ultimately, Schwarzenegger and the Democrats gave into a series of 
demands by a holdout Republican senator to eliminate a proposed gas tax increase 
and to put a number of ballot measures on the ballot, including a measure asking 
voters to establish a “top two” primary in California.
36
 
Weintraub‟s book ends after the 2006 election, and that is a shame, as 
some of Schwarzenegger‟s toughest battles have come since then.  (I hope that 
Weintraub will write a revised edition after 2010, when the entire Schwarzenegger 
era may be assessed.)  At the end of 2006, Schwarzenegger appeared as a phoenix 
risking from the ashes of the 2005 special election, ready to do renewed battle 
against the ever-shifting class of special interests.  That Schwarzenegger could 
win in a landslide election in 2006 is a testament to the force of his personality; 
after all, here was a politician who claimed he was too rich to be bought yet who 
raised over $300 million for his various campaign committees, much of it in six-
figure donations from major corporate interests.
37
 Voters rejected all the proposals 
he brought to the ballot in 2006, and he seemed to have little influence over 
members of his own party.  Schwarzenegger nonetheless remained popular, except 
among more partisan Democrats and Republicans; but as the sole member of the 
party of one, his alliance with “the people” has not proved to be up to the battle 
against the state legislature and the strong interest groups in the state.  As I 
suggest in Part IV below, it is too early to assess the overall success of the 
Schwarzenegger administration. His greatest legacy may be in the area of political 
reform. 
 
II. IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS 
 
 The Weintraub book is one that a political junkie would take for a day at 
the beach.  That‟s not true of CGS‟s tome, Democracy by Initiative: Shaping 
California’s Fourth Branch of Government.  First, the book clocks in at over 400 
                                                                                                    
36
 Kevin Yamamura, Aurelio Rojas and Jim Sanders, Budget Plan Goes to Schwarzenegger After 
Legislature’s OK, SAC. BEE, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.sacbee.com/topstories/story/1636911.html. 
(“As part of [Senator] Maldonado‟s agreement, lawmakers approved measures asking voters to 
approve constitutional amendments to establish an open primary system and ban legislative pay 
increases during deficit years. But legislative leaders refused to grant him his proposal to eliminate 
legislative pay altogether when the budget is late….Leaders also agreed to Maldonado's demand to 
eliminate the 12-cent additional gas tax…The money will be replaced with a 0.25 percent increase 
in the state income tax rate, federal stimulus dollars and more than $600 million in line-item 
vetoes.”). 
37
 Id. at 63. 
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oversized pages, and would be too bulky for a beach bag.  More importantly, the 
second edition of CGS‟s work on the California initiative process lacks the drama 
and personality of the Schwarzenegger story aptly told by Weintraub. 
 But the CGS book is worthy of close and serious study by those interested 
in the workings and dysfunctions of the California initiative process.  Almost 
every aspect of the process gets scrutiny in this work, from the rules on qualifying 
measures for the ballot, to campaign financing, to the Secretary of State‟s website, 
to media coverage of initiatives, to the scope of the initiative power.  No question 
is too big or too small for this volume, from whether California voters should be 
allowed to “revise” rather than simply “amend” the state constitution (yes
38
) to 
whether there should be a mix of serif and sans serif typeface used in the ballot 
pamphlet to improve readability (also yes
39
). 
 CGS proceeds from a progressivist tradition, accepting the “people power” 
notion behind the original impetus for direct democracy, and seeking to return the 
California initiative process to the grassroots.  The main message of the book 
appears to be about getting enough (and the right) information to voters to make 
informed decisions about how to vote on ballot measures.  Thus, the book argues 
that (1) money plays too great of a role in both the qualification process and ballot 
measure elections, especially given one-sided spending for some initiatives;
40
 (2) 
the press does not do a good job adequately and fairly covering ballot measure 
issues;
41
 and (3) the Secretary of State‟s office needs to do a better job in 
communicating relevant information to voters, especially through Internet-based 
technologies.
42
   
 The analysis along these lines is somewhat unsatisfying, for two reasons.  
First, the book makes a number of unstated assumptions about how voters respond 
to information, advertising, and cues in the ballot measure process.  That is, the 
recommendations in the communications area will seem sensible only if one 
already has adopted the CGS worldview about the role that campaign advertising 
                                                                                                    
38
 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 4, at 228. 
39
 Id. at 246. 
40
 Id. at 13, ch. 8.  As Matsuska notes, the CGS volume does a good job pointing readers to the 
relevant scholarly literature.  He notes that after citing Dan Lowenstein‟s work on one-sided 
spending, the book “then also alters to reader to a recent series of papers, some unpublished, that 
question the conventional view based on larger data sets and more sophisticated empirical 
techniques than were employed by the first generation of research.”  John Matsusaka, Initiatives: 
Slouching Toward Respectability?, 8 ELECTION L.J. 55, 57 (2009). 
41
 Id., ch. 7. 
42
 Id., ch. 6.  CGS is more satisfied with some other aspects of the process.  For example, it 
supports the current means by which judges review initiatives for violation of the single-subject 
rule.  See id. at 330.  I am much more skeptical of the use of the single-subject rule.  See Richard 
L. Hasen, Ending Court Protection of Voters from the Initiative Process, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PT 115 (2006). 
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and money play in ballot measure elections.  If one does not accept the world 
view, there is little in the book to convince a reader that it is the correct reading. 
 More importantly, the authors propose a series of changes to California‟s 
initiative process that are of dubious constitutionality.  For example, CGS 
advocates a $100,000 contribution limit in ballot measure campaigns (with a 
$10,000 limit to candidate-controlled ballot measure committees), as well as a 
limit on total expenditures spent by ballot measure committees supporting or 
opposing a measure.
43
  Aside from the limit on contributions to candidate-
controlled committees, these other measures are likely unconstitutional.
44
  Along 
similar lines, CGS advocates a return to the “Fairness Doctrine” in the context of 
ballot measure elections, requiring broadcaster to cover both sides of ballot 
measure campaigns and to give some free advertising to make up for one-sided 
advertising in a ballot measure election.
45
  The Obama administration does not 
appear poised to revive the Fairness Doctrine.
46
  Even if it did, I would not want 
to be on the side of the Doctrine before the Roberts Court.
47
 
 It is not that the authors believe that their proposals would pass 
constitutional muster; they are clear that there are serious constitutional doubts 
with some of their proposals.  But the authors did not take the next step, and argue 
for potential changes that might be on more solid constitutional footing.  For 
example, the authors reject as unworkable or impractical a public financing 
program for ballot measures.
48
  Yet they offer nothing else that could deal with the 
problem of large spending (or one-sided spending) in ballot measure elections. 
 The one area missing from the otherwise-comprehensive analysis of the 
California initiative process relates to the potential for the process to produce anti-
minority legislation.
49
  Proposition 187 (and anti-undocumented workers measure) 
                                                                                                    
43
 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 4, at 307-09. 
44
 See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure 
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005).  CGS relies heavily on my 
article to argue for the constitutionality of all of these measures, though I think they paint the 
possibility of constitutionality of spending limits and general contribution limits in a much brighter 
way than I did in my article. 
45
 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 4, at 272-74. 
46
 See John Eggerton, Obama Restates Opposition to Return to Fairness Doctrine, Broadcasting 
and Cable, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/174455-
Obama_Restates_Opposition_to_Return_of_Fairness_Doctrine.php.  
47
 For a look at the Roberts Courts views of First Amendment doctrine in the analogous campaign 
finance context, see Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory 
Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064 (2008) 
48
 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 4, at 313-14. 
49
 Matsusaka also faults the book for “the absence of any connection between [CGS‟s] reform 
agenda and the serious problems facing the state.”  Matsuska, supra note 40, at 57.  Though the 
book does not deal with these interconnections, CGS is otherwise doing so, including through co--
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and Proposition 209 (an anti-affirmative action measure) get barely a mention in 
the book.  (The book‟s publication preceded the passage of Proposition 8, banning 
gay marriage in the California Constitution).  Though CGS mentions Julian Eule‟s 
important argument that courts should more closely scrutinize initiative measures 
because they lack the usual legislative filters that can protect minority rights,
50
 
they do not do anything with it.  It is as though their Progressive vision has 
blinded them to the real possibility that true voter interests may sometimes be to 
trample minority rights. 
 Overall, however, the book is extremely valuable.  Anyone thinking about 
reforming the California initiative process should begin with the CGS volume and 
its careful and comprehensive approach to initiative reform. 
 
III. SATISFYING THE VOTERS 
 
 Like the Weintraub book, Baldassare and Katz‟s The Coming of Age of 
Direct Democracy
51
 covers the period from the California recall through the 2006 
elections.  Like the CGS book, the Baldassare and Katz volume does not make 
good beach reading.  But the book stands as a clear and comprehensive record of 
California public opinion leading up to and through the first term of the 
Schwarzenegger administration.  Baldassare is the President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), which runs one of the 
most respected polling operations in the state. 
The thesis of the book is that California has moved toward a “hybrid 
democracy,” with an ever-increasing role for the initiative process in the state.  
The authors claim that “[a] new system of governance has evolved in California 
over five elections in a half-decade of furious political activity.  An era of a 
„hybrid democracy is now underway, with elected officials and voters at the ballot 
box jointly sharing responsibility for making public policy.”
52
  They further state 
that this “is not a temporary trend, as all indications point to permanent power 
sharing between representative government and direct democracy.”
53
 
With the benefit of just a bit more hindsight than was available since this 
book was published, the Baldassare and Katz claim appears exaggerated.  It is too 
much to say that voters and the legislature “jointly share responsibility” for 
                                                                                                                                     
organizing meetings on a potential constitutional convention for the state.  See 
http://www.bayareacouncil.org/docs/CCC_Agenda.pdf. 
50
 Id. at 320-22 (citing Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1506 
(1999)). 
51
 Baldassare & Katz, supra note 3. 
52
 Id. at 219.   
53
 Id.   
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making public policy in California, at least any more than has been true 
historically.  The 32.5% approval rating of ballot measures from 2002 through 
2008
54
 is actually lower than the period in the 1980s, when 48% of initiatives 
were approved,
55
 or the 1990s, when 39% were approved.
56
  The same is true of 
the number of initiatives approved: 21 approvals in the 1980s,
57
 24 in the 1990s,
58
 
and 14 from 2002 to 2008.
59
  Nor do the authors make the case that the initiatives 
approved in this decade were qualitatively more important than those in earlier 
decades.  The main difference between earlier decades and this decade is the 
California recall and the current governor‟s professed desire to use the devices of 
direct democracy.  The recall is not likely to be repeated any time soon, and 
Governor Schwarzenegger‟s attempts to harness “people power” to bypass the 
legislature have not proven to be very successful. 
The main benefit of the Baldassare and Katz book is that it offers detailed 
and interesting PPIC polling data for the 2000s, especially regarding voters‟ views 
on the initiative process.  Consistent with the approach of the CGS book, 
California voters like the initiative process, but are concerned about the role of 
money in the process and the potential for voter information overload.   
Thus, in August 2006, 71% of likely voters in California “said they were 
satisfied with the way the initiative process is working in California today,”
60
 a 
trend that crossed party lines and demographic groups.
61
 Similarly, in 2005, 42% 
of likely voters said that initiative should have the greatest influence on policy in 
California, compared to 35% for the legislature and 16% for the governor.
62
   
Nonetheless, in 2004, 35% of adults thought the initiative process needed 
“major changes,”
63
 almost the same percentage when the question was asked in 
2000.
64
  “More than six in ten adults (62%) and likely voters (61%) …. said there 
generally were too many propositions on the ballot.”
65
  In addition, 65% of likely 
voters “believed that special interests had „a lot‟ of control over initiatives.”
66
  In 
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 See supra note x. 
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 Id. at 157. 
63
 Id. at 121.  
64
 Id. at 122 (“when we last asked this question in October 2000, 32 percent of Californians said 
major changes were needed and 43 percent called for minor changes in the initiative process.”). 
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 Id. at 158.  
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 Id. 
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November 2006, 56% of voters “strongly agreed that too much money was spent 
by the initiative campaigns.”
67
 
 The especially interesting thing about voter opinion on the initiative 
process in California is how steady is has been throughout the decade, even given 
the unusual circumstances of the 2003 gubernatorial recall and a governor 
committed to the initiative process as a matter of ideology and policy.
68
  
California voters liked the process whether they agreed with the governor and his 
initiative agenda or not, and that trend is likely to continue in California after 
Schwarzenegger leaves office. 
 
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
 Despite the hoopla about Governor Schwarzenegger as a “party of one” 
and a new age of “hybrid democracy” in California, the pattern in the 2000s 
appears mostly the same as that of past decades:  California voters have 
occasionally passed important measures through the initiative process, but for the 
most part public policy in the state continues to be crafted by the state legislature 
and the governor. 
 The best hope for increased “people power” through the initiative process 
is for initiative proponents to focus on good government measures that assure a 
better legislative process, such as open primaries, redistricting reform, and budget 
reform.
69
  Historically, about 21% of voter initiatives have involved government 
                                                                                                    
67
 Id. at 207. 
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 In a survey conducted by PPIC after the November 2008 elections, Mark Baldassare et al., 
Californians & Their Government, PPIC Statewide Survey, December 2008, 
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 PPIC also polled about some specific reforms.  77% of California voters favored a system 
of review and revision of proposed initiatives to try to avoid legal issues and drafting errors.  The 
same margin favored a period of time in which the initiative sponsor and legislature could meet to 
see if there were a compromise solution before initiatives go on the ballot.  Half the voters 
believed initiatives should be allowed only in November general elections, rather than also in 
primaries and special elections.  Id. 
69
 At the time of this writing, proponents were circulating an initiative in California to lower the 
threshold for legislative budget approval from two-thirds to 55%.  See Mark Rothfield & Eric 
Bailey, California’s Budget Fiasco Legacy Could Be Reform, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, 
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and the political process.
70
  Already in this decade voters had considered more 
initiatives in this subject area than they had in any other decade since the 
establishment of the initiative in California.
71
 
  The fate of redistricting reform in the 2000s provides a good lesson for 
how initiatives may be used to enact political reform.  Governor Schwarzenegger 
first backed a redistricting measure in 2005, Proposition 77, that Democrats 
widely viewed as a political power grab.  Gubernatorial recall proponent Ted 
Costa sponsored the measure, and it the ballot pamphlet argument in favor of the 
measure was not signed by any of the major good government groups in 
California.
72
  The measure failed at the ballot box, garnering only 40% of the 
vote.
73
  It was supported only by a majority of Republicans, but opposed by 
majorities of Democrats and independents.
74
 
 Voters only supported redistricting reform when Governor 
Schwarzenegger teamed up with good government groups such as Common 
Cause,
75
 and gave up on congressional redistricting, which had national partisan 
implications. Proposition 11, which appeared on the November 2008 ballot, 
squeaked by with 50.9% of the vote,
76
 securing the support of 59% of 
Republicans and 54% of independents, though only 44% of Democrats.
77
 Its 
passage illustrated a coalitional model that could be used for future good 
government reform.  An open primary measure likely will rely heavily on 
independent voters, and budget reform on Democrats and independents.  But the 
cooperation of good government groups and their “seal of approval” could be 
quite important. 
 The lesson of the 2000s, as told in various ways by these three books, is 
that California voters like the tools of direct democracy, but are generally 
judicious in which initiatives they are willing to approve.   Though the public 
policy of the state cannot be directed primarily by the voters through plebiscitary 
democracy, voters can take steps to improve the system by which the legislature 
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and governor make policy.  If Schwarzenegger leaves office with the passage of 
redistricting reform, primary reform, and budgetary reform, these would be 
significant accomplishments.  That‟s a more modest version of “hybrid 
democracy,” but one that is a more realistic vision of what voters can accomplish. 
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